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IN THE SUPRBMB COURT
OF THE
STATE OP t11'AH

---------------------------------------

l JOSEPH TERRY SIEBOLD,
PetitionerAppellant,

I
I

va.

DIR

I

w.

TURBER,
IARDEll, UTAH STATE

PRISCll,

Re•pondent.

:

CASE RO.
10551

I
I

I

-------------------------------------BRIEF 07

APP~ll'l'

--------------------------------------

I
I

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The petitioner - appellant, Joseph

I

(Terry siebold, appeals from a judgment of the
District court of Salt Lake County, dismissing

appellants complaint for a writ of habeas corpus against respondent.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT:
Petitioner - appellant filed a Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District
Coilrt in and for Salt Lake County, on November

19, 1965.

The respondent, John

w.

Turner,

Warden of the Utah state Prison, answered the
I

I Complaint for writ of Habeas Corpus on the 6th
day of December,
1 Hanson,

1966' by and through Phil L.

Attorney General of Utah.

I

A pre-trial

I was held on the 3rd day of December, 1965 and

-2-

J

a pre-trial order signed and entered by JUdge
Aloon J. Anderson on the 7th day of December,
1%5.

on the 6th day of January, 1966, a

nearing was held on the matter and after making
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on the
11th day of January,

1966, Judge Aldon J.

Anderson entered Judgment against petitionerappellant, dismissing his Application and Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denying
the

same.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL.
Appellant sul:xnits that the JUdgment

of the trial court should be reversed and his
Application and Complaint for writ of Habeas
Corpus should be granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 3rd day of August, 1964, appel-

-3-

lant and one Dennis J. Demarais were arrested
10

Uintah County, state of Utah, and charged

with the crime of assault with intent to
corrmit murder, pursuant to Section 76-30-14,
utah code Annotated, 1953, and charged with

robbery pursuant to section 76-51-1, Utah
code Annotated, 1953,

(Exhibits D-1 and D-2).

on August 4, 1964 they were brought before
Justice of the Peace, R. A. McConkie, where
the complaints were read to them.
D-1 and D-2).

{Exhibit

At that time, appellant was

without funds with which to retain counsel.
(R-42).

Appellant testified that at the time

they were brought before the JUstice of the
Peace no mention was ever made regarding their
right to counsel. (R-42).

County Attorney

Hammond testified that the JUstice of the

-4-

peace advised them that if they wanted to

talk to an attorney they could have time to
do that.

(R-88) •

County Attorney Hammond

also advised them they had a right to confer

.

with an attorney but did not tell them that

'

they could do so even though they didn't have
any funds.

(R-90).

Having waived Preliminary Hearing,
Appellant was bound over to the Fourth JUdicial District court and arraignment was set
for August 12, 1964.

(Exhibits D-1 and D-2).

On August 12, 1964, defendants were arraigned

' before the Hon. Joseph E. Nelson in the Fourth
J\ldicial District court in and for Uintah

County, state of Utah.

(Exhibits D-1 and D-2).

The court appointed Ray E. Nash, Esq. to re-

present appellant and Demarais on both charges.
(Exhibits D-1 and 0-2).

-s-

At the arraigrunent, appellant pleaded
guilty to the charge of robbery and was remanded to the custody of the Uintah County

sheriff to be delivered to the court on

september 9, 1964 for pronouncement of judgment (Exhibit D-2).

At the arraignment,

} appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of
assault with intent to commit murder and was
remanded to the custody of Uintah County
Sheriff to be delivered to the court on sep-

tember 9, 1964, for trial. (Exhibit D-1).
The Fourth Judicial Court, in and for
Uintah County, State of Utah, the Hon. Maurice
Harding presiding, pronounced judgment on
September 9, 1964 on the charge of robbery,
/ to which appellant had previously pleaded

I
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I guilty and sentenced him to

be confined in

the utah State Prison for an indeterminate

period of not less than five years.

I o-2).

(Exhibit

on September 9, 1964, appellant

changed his plea· on the charge of assault

J with intent to coDBDit murder from not guilty

I to

guilty.

(Exhibit D-3).

Appellant then

waived the time for pronouncement of judg-

ment and the court entered Judgment on
September 9, 1964, that appellant be confined
in the Utah state Prison for an indeterminate

period of not less than five years on the
1

charge of assault with intent to COlmlit murder.

(Exhibit

o-i) •

Appellant was then delivered

by the Sheriff of Uintah County to the Warden

of the Utah state Prison for execution of the
Judgments on both charqes.

-7-

(R-26).

sometime after his arrest on August
31 1964, and prior to the pronouncement of·

/Judgment on September 9, 1964, appellant

I

waived extradition proceedings to the State

of California and was returned to California

1 for investigation of murder.
I

California

authorities did not press the investigation
for murder and returned appellant to the state

of Utah where he was arraigned and judgment
pronounced.

There is no evidence or record

on these facts as the pre-trial order made
and entered by the Hon. Aldon J. Anderson
precluded the introduction of evidence as to
extradition proceedings.

I

-8-

(R-9)

POINT I.

'l'BE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IH FINJ;>DlG THAT APPELLANT HAS HOT

BEEM DEPRZVED OF A STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTI'l'U'l'IOBAL RIGHT.
j

Appellants Complaint for Writ of

I

.

Babea• Corpus came on for hearing before the

JHonorable

Aldon J. Anderson one of the Judges

of the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake county.

After hearing the teati-

ny of witnesses, receiving exhibits and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Honorable
.JUdge made his Fi. . inga of Pact and conclusions

of Law.

No finding was made as to when appellant

waa appointed counsel although the record shows
~W18el

was appointed by the Uintah County

iatrict court at the arraignment on August
112, 1964 (Exhibit D-4) , nine daya after appellants

l

arre1t on August J, 1964 (Exhibits

D-2) •

D-4

The Honorable Judge found in his

-9-

and

j conclusions

of Law that,

M

•

•

•

they have

)been deprived of no state or federal constitutional right."

(R-16) Baaed on this

j conclusion of law, which appellant submits

\was in error, Judgment was entered in his
l

jcomplaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus, dia-

lmi11ing
I

the same.
It is clear from the record that

at the time of his arrest and at the time
he waa taken before JUstice of the Peace
McConkie, he was without funds with which

to retain counsel. (R-42) Although it may
I

appear that JUatice of the Peace McConkie

1adviaed appellant of hi• right to counsel,
it is clear that he was not advised that counsel
Would be appointed for him if be were without

I

funde. (R-90) •

1

I

Appellant submits that he was de-

\prived of his right to counsel at critical

I

-10-

1

stages of the proceedings against him.

jwithout
I

t~e aid of counsel he was required

' to determine whether or not to waive a pre-

j liminary hearing (a-89)

1

whether or not to

'
'wive
extradition proceedings to the State

'of california

and whether or ·not to waive

\extradition proceedings back to the State

\•f utah

(the record i• devoid of evidence

\in this regard due to the pre-trial order JBBde

~y JUdge Anderson) •

(R-8, 9) •

These examples

are only the legal matter• which appellant
11

confronted with and do not include other

tter• which may have necessitated the advice

I

~f

t

counael.
The Sixth Amendment to the tJni ted

tate1 Constitution and the constitution of

t•h,
\

j

Article I, Section 12, provide••

-11-

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right • • • to
have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup.
"?,.J;(c?S. "?3.:.-; _c;.<,,,,q,_ 41 7?/'

792 (1963), the united States Supreme
.\court ruled that the right to counsel is
jl
,1 one of the fundamental rights of an accused

~and is obligatory on the states under the
14th

Amendment to the united States Const i-

t tution.

In the Gideon case, the court quoted

~JUstice Southerland in Powell v. Alabama,
,, 287

u.s. 45, 68, 53 Sup. ct. 55, 64,

77 Law

}M.
158 (1932) as follows:
,

t
1

"'l'he right to be heard would
be in many caaes of little avail
if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counael.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and aaaet imea no akill in the science
of the law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself

"whether the indictment is
good or bad. He ia unfamiliar with the rule of evidence. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to the iaaue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding band
of counsel at evei:y step in
the proceedin~s aGainat him.
without it, t oug he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he doe• not
know how to eatabliah hi•
innocence." (Emphasis Added).
Under the decision of the court in
r------.;..;;......;.;.;:;..-:;..;~~.&.:.h~t,

the states are required to

int counsel for indigent persona in all

riainal prosecutions.

The question of when

,nindigent peraon ha• the right to have

~ai1111e1

appointed for him baa been con-

ridered by this court in State v. Braaach,

I
I

-u-

j19 utah 450,

229 P.2d 289 (1951).

There

~e defendants claimed that they were de~rived

of their right to counsel at the pre-

iminary hearing.

The record showed that

hey requested counsel be appointed both at

~e

!

t

g.

arraignment and at the preliminary hearThey were informed that they were

titled to counsel but that until the case

to the District Court they would have

oprocure such services at their own expense
without the aid of the state.
In the Braasch case, thi• court
ated at Page 460:

"Thus, at the preliminary
hearing the State ought to
provide counsel for any
defendant desiring but unable to procure counsel for
himaelf. Thia should have
been made clear to the defelidanta before they de-

-14-

•cided whether they were
read' for the hearing.•
CllliP asis Added).
'l'he court ultimately held that the
failure to advise of the right to have

l

coun•el for the preliminary hearing, al-

though error, was not prejudicial error.
since the Braasch decision, the Federal

I

courts have more particularly set forth the

extent of an indigent's right to counsel in
the early stages of the proceedings against

him.

In Harvey v. State of Mis•i•sippi,
petitioner sought. a Writ of Habeas corpus
on the ground that he wu_ denied due process.
'!he petitioner, Sarvey, was convicted

Oil

the

Iba1ie of a guilty plea entexed without the

I

'a11ietance of counsel and without being

ldviaed of his right to the assistance of

L

~ounsel.
uch

The court noted that "waiver of

right to counsel M cannot

be

presumed frcm

e mere fact that the accused appeared witht

counsel or failed to request counael •

.

v. Cochran, 1962, 369 U.S. 506,

2 Sup. Ct. 884, 8 Law F.d.2d 701 Daughty v.

bxwell, 1964, 376 U.S. 202, 84 Sup. Ct.
02, 11 Law &L 650.

The court noted at page 269:

MOne accused of crime baa
the right to the aaai•taace
of counsel before entering
a plea because of the di•advantageoua poaition of an
unaaaiated layman in a court
of law and because of tbe
seriou• mn•equencea which -y
attend a guilty plea. Such
diaadvantagea and coaaequence•
. .y weigh as heavily on an
accused misdemeanant a• on
an accused felon. The record
reveals that the guilty plea
entered in the caae at bar bad
grievoua c::onaequencea iadeed."
-16-

I

I
\

r

I

I

In Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368

I

T•

S • 52, 82 Sup.

ct. 157 (1961) the united

tates Supreme court held that the arraignthe State of Alabama is so critical

t

stage in the Alabama criminal procedure

hat denial of counsel at arraignment required

reversal of the conviction even though no
rejudice was shown.

The court noted that

t the time of arraigrunent in Alabama the
efense of insanity must be pleaded or it is

oat unless it is accepted at the trial judge• s
iscretion.

The exercise of this discretion

a not appealable.

Also, at the time of

rraigment pleas in abatement and motions

~o
~t

I

I
I

...

qua1h must be raiaed.

The court atated

Page 158:

"Whatever may be the function
and importance.of arraignment
in other jurisdictions, we have
said enough to show that in

-17-

wAlabama it ia a critical
stage in a criminal proceeding.
What happens there may affect
the whole trial. Available
defenses may be as irretrievably loat, if not then and there
asaerted, aa they are when an
accused represented by counsel
waives a right joratrategic
purpoaea.w
The court, quoting from prier Supreme

I court cases stated:

wAn accused in a capital case
requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not: guilty,
he faces the danger of convi ction because he does not
know haw to establish hi•
innocence. '.l'he guiding_hand
of counael ia needed at the
trial lest the unwary concede
that which only bewilder.eat
or ignorance could justify er
pay a penalty which ia greater
than the law of the state
exacts for the offe. .e which
they in fact in law cCllllitted.
But the same pitfall•, or like

-18-

ttones, face an accused in
Alabama who was arraigned
without counsel at his side.
When one pleads to a capital
charge without benefit of
counsel, we do not stop to
determine whether prejudice
resulted. (citing cases) In
this case, as in those, the
degree of prejudice can never
be known. Only the presence
of counsel CDuld have enabled
this accused to know all the
defenses available to him and
to plead intelligently."
Upon the foregoing, the United States
Supreme court reversed the ruling of the Alabama
Supreme Court •
In White v. The State of Maryland,
373 U.S. 59, 83 Sup. ct. 1050, 10 L.F.d. 2d
193 (1963), the united States Supreme court
held that under Maryland law the denial of

I the

defendant• s right to counsel at the pre-

! liminary hearing necessitated the reversal
of his conviction for murder.

-19-

In that case

r

f• petitioner

was arrested and brought

~fore a Magistrate for a preliminary hear-

g at which time he plead guilty to the charge

murder.

Thereafter, at what Maryland calla

~ arraigmnent, the petitioner had counsel

~inted

for him and entered a plea of not

t

'lty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

ever, at his trial, the plea of guilty made
his preliminary hearing was introduced in

'dence against him.

It was contended that

er Maryland Law there was no requirement
any practicable possibility under the
11nt criminal p•ocedure to appoint counsel

the petitioner at the preliminary hearing,
wats it necessary for the petitioner to

er a plea at that time.
The court atated at Page 1051:

-20-

"Whatever may be the normal
function of the preliminary
hearing under Maryland law,
it was in this case aa critical a stage as arraignment
under Alabama law. For
petitioner entered a plea
before the Magistrate and that
plea was taken at the time when
he had no counsel.
"We repeat what we said in
Hamilton v. Alabama, supra,
at 55, 82 Sup. Ct. at 159,
that we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted:
'only the presence of
counsel could have enabled this accused to
know all the defenses
available to him and
to plead intelligently!

•we therefore hold that Baailton

L

v. Ala.ha•• governa and tlii jiidgment 'bilaw must be and i• reversed.•
Appellant respectfully submits that

•r the holdings of Baailton v. Alal>8-, supra,

~ !!!ti te

v. state ef Maryland, appellant '•

-21-

j

~rraignment before the Justice of the Peace
such

18

r

a •critical stage" in the criminal

roceedings against him as to require the

ppointment of counsel.

As stated in a paper

Ronald I. Meahbeaher1

I.

I

I

"The initial appearance or
arraignment before a Magi•trate may, in addition to pleading, involve a decision whether
to waive preliminary examination and the setting of bail.
In some situations it might be
beneficial to waive the preliminary examination, but in moat
cases it is an excellent device
for di•covery. In any event,
the strategy to be employed can
moat effectively be deterained
by coun•el. The lawyer may alao
aid hi• client in •eeing that
the bail aet is not exceaaive
or perhaps even have tbe defendant releaaed without bail.
'l'hua, for purposes of strategy
or pm aible early release, the
initial appearance or arraignment is a 'critical stage' and
under the rational of Hamilton
and White an offer of appointed

-22-

I

I

"counsel and advising of the
right to retain counsel is
constitutionally required."
The Hennepin, Vol. 35/No.6, p.

jea.
As Professor Kamisar has stated, there

exists a

!

" • • (G) atehouse of American
criminal procedure--through
which most defendants journey
and beyond which many never get-(where) the enemy of the state
is a depersonalized 'subject'
to be 'sized up' and subjected
to 'interrogation tactics and
techniques most appropriate for
the occaaion'1 he ia 'game' to
be atalked and cornered.
Here
ideal• are checked at the door,
'realities• faced, and the prestige of law enforcement vindicated.
once he leave4 the 'gatehouse'
and entera the 'manaion'--if he
ever gets there--the eneay of
the atate is reperaonalize4,
even dignified, the public
invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of individual

I

I

-23-

"freedan fran law enforcement
celebrated."
Kamisar, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure,
in Kiiilaar, Inbau & Sowle,
Criminal Justice in Our Time,
20 (1965) (Magna carta Essays).
Utah does not cane expressly within

\the

holding of the White case inasmuch as

'otah does not permit the entering of a plea
at the preliminary hearing.

At that hear-

ing the defendant may make a statement, not

uader oath, after being informed of hia right
to remain ailent without risking later caarent

on hi• ailence .and after being informed of
the admissibility of a statement against
him at trial.

77-15-35)

(utah Code Annotated, Sec.

However, at the preliminary hear-

in9 and at the request of the prosecutor,

the Magistrate must order the transcription

-24-

of testimony which may be admitted at trial,
thu•

possibly depriving the defendant of his

opportunity for cross examination at a trial

by jury.

As Professor Mazor so ably put it

I

) in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 9, p. 68:

I

I
I

I
I

"Even if it be thought that
characterization of the preliminary examination as
critical can be avoided
where no such testimony is
taken or obviated through
deletion of this provision,
there are broader aspects
of the use of the preliminary
hearing which suggest the
necessity of providing
counsel. Whereas sane
states have provided for
discovery in criminal cases,
apart f rcm the preliainary
examination utah has not.
Thus, the occasion which it
affords for the pre-trial
examination of witnesses
upon compulsory process ia
a unique and irretrievable
opportunity for the defenae.
Mor would it seem that a rule
of prejudicial error can be
applied in this context, for
-25-

"it is forever unknowable what
information counsel might have
gleaned frcn the preliminary
examination. "
It is clear from the Hamilton decision•

'·and other decisions in the same line of cases
i

Ithat the court does not look to whether or not
\~e

accused was prejudiced by his lack of

Icounsel.

The mere fact that his constitu-

tional rights were denied is sufficient
reason to overrule the judgment of the trial
court.

-26-

'
I
I

CONCLUSION

f

Appellant sho11191d by creditable evi-

11oence in the Court below that he was depri~ed of

~vice
,,

his constitutional right to the ad-

of counsel at the critical stages of

the criminal

proceedings against him.

Counsel

as not appointed for him until the proceed~ngs

had reached the District Court level.

y that time, matters which may have materially

tided his
11

defense had already been lost to him

nd it must be presumed that he was prejudiced

Appellant respectfully submits that

e trial court erred in concluding that he
ad been deprived of no constitutional rights

I
j

-27-

and dismissing his Complaint for writ of

t eabeas

corpus •

The trial court should be

reversed and appellant's Writ of Habeas
corpus granted.

Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
• ··- -----:7

/.-::-r

/

--~-~
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,p- / ~.

/

~ ~~-- ~~~~'--

F. ALAN FLETCHER
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for appellant.
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